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Abstract
China’s capital-intensive, export-oriented, spectacular economic growth since launching
its open-door policy and economic reforms in late 1978 not only has created jobs and has
lifted millions of the Chinese people out of poverty, but also has given rise to
unprecedented environmental pollution and CO2 emissions. While estimates of the
embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ, both single country studies for China
and global studies show a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 emissions embedded in trade. This
portion of CO2 emissions had helped to turn China into the world’s largest carbon emitter,
and is further widening its gap with the second largest emitter. This raises the issue of
who should be responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon cost of
exports. China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not all, of that costs. While
China’s stance is understandable, this paper has argued from a broad and balanced
perspective that if this is pushed too far, it will not help to find solutions to this issue. On
the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage for a number of reasons. However, aligning
this responsibility with China does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on domestic
actions. In that context, the paper recommends specific actions that need to be taken
internationally as well as domestically in order to effectively control the embedded CO2
emissions in China’s trade.
Keywords: Carbon emissions embodied in trade; Consumption-based accounting;
Production-based accounting; Processing trade; Carbon tariffs; Energy policy
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1. Introduction
China had been the world’s second largest carbon emitter behind the U.S. for years.
Based on the trends in the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. EIA (2004) estimated that China’s
CO2 emissions are not expected to catch up with the world’s largest carbon emitter by
2030. This seems to have been implanted in people’s minds until the International Energy
Agency (IEA) indicated in April 2007 that China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s
largest carbon emitter in 2007 or 2008. The Chinese senior official at the National
Coordination Committee on Climate Change immediately rebutted that claim, criticizing
the lack of statistical evidence. Yet that IEA claim is an estimate for the future, based on
current trends. Although the time span for such an estimate is as short as one year or two
years, it is not the historical statistics on carbon emissions. So using a lack of statistical
basis to reject that claim is not compelling (Zhang 2007b). This early remark by the IEA
had been incorporated into the findings of its flagship report World Energy Outlook 2007,
reaffirming that China was already ranked number one as the world’s largest carbon
emitter in 2007 (IEA 2007). Another study estimates that China’s CO2 emissions
surpassed those of the U.S. by 8% in 2006 (MNP 2007).
China’s high absolute CO2 emission levels are the combined effects of a large
population and a coal-fueled, rapidly growing economy. Being the workshop of the world
also leads to a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 emissions embedded (or embodied, which is
used inter-exchangeably throughout this paper) in goods that are exported to
industrialized countries as well as to other developing countries (e.g., IEA 2007; Davis
and Caldeira 2010; Peters and Hertwich 2008; Peters et al. 2011; Shui and Harriss 2006;
Weber et al. 2008). Following brief discussion on the magnitude of China’s CO2
emissions embodied in trade, this paper will focus on the issue of who should be
responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon cost of exports. This is a
very sensitive and complex issue. China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not
all, of the costs of that. While China’s stance is understandable, this paper has argued
from a broad and balanced perspective that if this is pushed too far, it will not help to find
solutions to this issue. On the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage for a number of
reasons.
However, assigning China’s responsibility for its carbon emissions embodied in
exports does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on domestic actions. To effectively
control the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade, actions need to be taken
internationally as well as domestically. At the domestic level, the paper suggests that
China needs to focus on restructuring and rebalancing its economy through adjusting
some policies including pro-trade policies, upgrading its trade structure and energy mix,
improving energy efficiency, and strengthening the implementation and enforcement of
environmental regulations and standards to prod companies to take increasing corporate
social responsibility. At the international level, China and the international community
need to strengthen coordination in the internalization of the carbon costs, ensuring that
the costs of carbon emissions embodied in traded goods be reflected in the price to the
consuming countries as well as those goods for domestic use. This is a feasible means of
passing through a carbon cost to consumers without consumption-based accounting of
CO2 emissions. Moreover, given that developing countries have explicitly linked progress
in climate finance commitments from industrialized countries with many other issues in
international climate change negotiations, the paper concludes that the delivery of their
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climate finance pledges will not only help build trust with their developing country
counterparts and break current impasses in international climate change negotiations, but
also is crucial to enabling China to accelerate its future development along a more
sustainable path.

2. How significantly CO2 emissions embodied in trade and China’s contribution?
Under the accounting rules of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), all
greenhouse gas emissions and removals are based on in-country production emissions.
Commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and its follow-up regimes are set and evaluated based on
this territorial-based emissions accounting system.
While Wyckoff and Ropp (1994) raised the trade-related emissions issue by
estimating the emissions embodied in manufactured imports of six OECD (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, it is only recently that the issue
of consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions has begun to emerge in analytical
literature serving the debate on the future climate change regime. Two examples are the
OECD study by Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) and the OECD Roundtable on Sustainable
Development study (Harrison et al. 2003) on embodied CO2 emissions in international
trade. The two studies conclude that the current focus on in-country production emissions
alone tells only part of the story because a country’s global impact in sustainability terms
may be distorted by the fact that current measures based on production emissions do not
take into account embodied CO2 emissions in international trade. So a country’s
measured emissions levels may be misleadingly low under the Kyoto accounting
framework if it produces very few emissions but imports large quantities of goods whose
production gives rise to significant emissions, indicating that a production-based
indicator which does not take into account trade flows can give a misleading
underestimation of the emissions caused by a country’s consumption patterns. At a
minimum, these findings point out the importance of a better understanding of
consumption trends so that efforts by industrialized countries to address climate change
are not overestimated or overstated by focusing just on in-country production emissions –
and correspondingly, that the global challenge ahead is not underestimated.
In recognition of the importance of trade in regional emissions trends, a number
of studies have since attempted to quantify the contribution of embodied CO2 emissions
in international trade in more detail and with different geographical coverage. Recent
studies of the most broadest country and sector coverage - one by Davis and Caldeira
(2010) and another by Peters et al. (2011) - have quantified embodied CO2 emissions in
global trade involving 113 countries and 57 economic sectors from 1990 to 2008. Peters
et al. (2011) found that the CO2 emissions from the production of traded goods and
services increased from 4.3 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 7.8 Gt CO2 in 2008. Measured as a
percentage of global CO2 emissions, the contribution of embodied CO2 emissions rose to
26% in 2008 from 20% in 1990 and 23% in 2004.
China has often been taken as a case either in a single China country study or as a
separate region in a global study, given China as the workshop of the world and its
export-driven economy, which are expected to lead to a chunk of its emissions embedded
in goods that are exported to industrialized countries as well as to other developing
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countries. Estimates of the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ. They depend
on the boundary assumed in the calculation of embedded CO2 emissions, the choice of
methodology (top-down input-out analysis versus bottom-up production processes of
specific products) and the treatment of technology and emission intensity data across
trading partners. Country-specific, detailed energy and carbon intensity data and
technology level required is crucial to the accuracy of the calculations. Simply assuming
either all imports produced using Chinese domestic technologies or all Chinese exports
produced using American domestic technologies (e.g., Shui and Harriss 2006) may
overestimate or underestimate China’s CO2 emissions embedded in trade because it fails
to capture potentially large national differences in technology levels across trading
partners. For example, assuming that the imports were produced using Chinese domestic
technologies, Peters et al. (2007) estimate CO2 emissions embedded in imports account
for 34% of China’s total emissions in 2002. But a later and more accurate estimate based
on the technology level in each exporting country puts a value at 6.6% (Peters and
Hertwich 2008).
It should be pointed out that although these studies adopt different methodologies
and use different datasets, they tend to draw similar conclusions. That is, given that
foreign trade has shown a remarkable growth in China, China is by far the largest net
exporter of CO2 emissions. Davis and Caldeira (2010) show that net exports accounted
for 22.5% of production-based CO2 emissions in China in 2004. Peters et al. (2011) find
that Chinese emissions accounted for 55% of the growth in global CO2 emissions from
1990 to 2008 and the production of Chinese exports accounted for 18% of the growth in
global CO2 emissions. Another observation is that, measured as a percentage of total CO2
emissions produced in China, a single country study for China tends to give a higher
estimate for the embedded CO2 emissions than those global studies based on more
accurate country trade flow and technology details. Pan et al. (2008) estimate China’s
CO2 emissions embodied in trade at 19% in 2001 and 30% in 2006 of its productionbased emissions. By contrast, Figure 1 shows China’s CO2 emissions, both productionand consumption-based, and its net emission transfers as a percentage of total productionbased emissions from 1990 to 2008 from a comprehensive global study based on more
accurate country trade flow and technology details of 113 countries and 57 economic
sectors. Given rapid increases in China’s trade since its accesses to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in December 2001 (Figure 2), as would be expected, China’s CO2
emissions, both production- and consumption-based, have been increasing rapidly since
2002 (Figures 1-2). Coincidentally, it is since 2002 that China reversed a decline trend in
its energy intensity which had gripped over the last two decades in the past century,
experiencing faster energy consumption growth than economic growth (see Figure 3). It
would be silly to blame this on the U.S., but if the U.S. had not withdrawn from the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, for its own competiveness concerns alone then the U.S. would
have kept the pressure on China just like it did immediately after Kyoto and is currently
doing, and China’s actual greenhouse gas emissions would be lower than their current
levels (Zhang 2011b). Moreover, the gap between the production- and consumptionbased CO2 emissions had been widening before the global financial crisis, with net
emission transfer increasing from 11% in 2001 to 21% in 2007. While the global
financial crisis had tempered the rapid growth of China’s trade, China’s CO2 emissions in
trade still accounted for 19% of its total production-based emissions in 2008.
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Figure 1 China’s production- and consumption-based CO2 emissions (million tons)
and net emission transfers as percentages of its production-based CO2 emissions,
1990-2008
Source: Drawn based on Peters et al. (2011).
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Figure 2 China’s GDP, exports and CO2 emissions, 1990-2009
Sources: Drawn based on Peters et al. (2011) and the United Nations Statistic Division
(2010).
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Figure 3 China’s energy intensity index and carbon intensity index (1980=100),
1980-2007
Sources: Drawn based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and Zhang (1997).

3. Who should be responsible for China’s CO2 emissions embodied in trade?
While estimates of the embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ, both single
country studies for China and global studies found a hefty chunk of China’s CO2
emissions embedded in trade. This portion of CO2 emissions had helped to turn China
into the world’s largest carbon emitter, and further widens its gap with the second largest
emitter. This raises the issue of who should be responsible for this portion of emissions
and bearing the carbon cost of exports (Ball 2009). Should the exporting countries be
responsible for consumption needs of importing countries? This is a very sensitive and
complex issue. However, this issue of whether the responsibility for externality caused by
traded goods lies with producers or consumers is not new. It has perplexed international
discussions on traded hardwoods for many years, where the externality may be
distributed between the exporting country and the importing country. Another example is
related to trade in the “virtual water”, which refers to the water used in the production
processes of agricultural or industrial product (see the research program on Virtual Water
Trade at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationInternational Hydrological Programme (Hoekstra and Hung 2002; Chapagain and
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Hoekstra 2003)). So a water-scarce country can import products that require a lot of
water in their production (the so-called import of “virtual water” as opposed to import of
real water), thus relieving the pressure on its own water resources. The dispute between
China and the EU over the exports of coking coal in the first half of 2004 also had a
nexus between producers and consumers. The EU closed many of its own coking plants
for environmental reasons, but pressed China to supply coking coal for its steelmakers.
The EU even threatened to take China to the WTO if China refused to revoke restrictions
on exports by 14 May 2004 and thus allow the EU to import coking coal at previous
levels.2
China certainly wants importers to cover some, if not complete, of the costs of
that (China Daily 2009). This was raised by Ma Kai, the then Chairman of the National
Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planning agency
overseeing national economic planning and climate response issues, at a press conference
organized by the Information Office of the State Council on 4 June 2007 (NDRC 2007).
China’s view is on the grounds that when a country’s CO2 emissions data for production
is higher than that for consumption, the country is in effect emitting CO2 to meet the
consumption needs of other countries. China’s stance is understandable. Pointing this out
at least helps to have a better understanding of China’s emissions and their contributions,
find solutions to address this issue and to bridge the gap between the concerns of China
and developed countries. However, if China follows some analysts to push this too far, on
the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage. Let me explain why.
China as the workshop of the world is largely the result of a comparative
advantage in the division of trade. Using less energy-efficient technologies to produce
goods for domestic use and exports is also largely dictated by its current stage of
development. Having said that, it is fair to say that rapidly rising carbon emissions and
emissions embedded in exports are also the results of China’s own failure to keep the
expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries under control and to implement
its own set industrial restructuring and sustainable development policies on the one hand
(Zhang 2007a, 2010a,c and 2011c) and its deliberate, pro-trade policies on the other hand.
China has not only adopted the common pro-trade policies, such as the depressed
exchange rate and export tax rebates, but has long used access to its unique giant
customer base as bargaining chips to persuade (or “as leverage to force” as called by
some U.S. law makers) foreign companies to open factories within its borders. China not
only has been criticized for keeping its currency artificially low, but also has confronted
with many disputes with its trading partners. They include and are not limited to the auto

2

Historically, conflicts over trade have almost always been about import barriers. It
remains to be seen whether the current WTO rules are strong enough to resolve the
growing number of disputes over restrictions on exports. The first test in the WTO is a
complaint filed in 2009 by the U.S., the European Union and Mexico, challenging alleged
Chinese export restrictions on nine key raw materials such as coke, bauxite, fluorspar and
magnesium. A second, and much tougher test, will come if the U.S., the EU, Japan and
other affected countries follow up by filing a WTO complaint challenging increasing
Chinese restrictions on the export of rare earth elements (Bacchus 2010).
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part tariffs (see Box 1), the 70% local content requirement for wind power projects,3 the
export quotas on nine metal ores and other raw materials, and the export quotas on rare
earths. While China may not admit it, all these policies are partly, if not completely,
intended to encourage foreign companies, in particular high-tech companies to move
production to China.4 With criticisms from and complaints by its trading partners, China
eventually abolished its policies on the auto part tariffs and the local content requirement
for wind power projects. Responding to a complaint by the United States, the European
Union and Mexico, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruled on 5 July 2011 that the
quotas imposed by China on exports of nine metal ores and other raw materials vital to
steel, chemical, aluminum and other industries violate international trade rules (WTO
2011).
At the core of this raw materials case is whether the WTO will allow export
restrictions to be used to protect the environment, an argument China has used to justify
limits on exports, including of rare earth ores under GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) Article XX. The raw materials panel concluded that since China’s
WTO agreement did not specifically invoke GATT rules for export duties relating to
these products, China can not now base its defense on a GATT provision. The Dispute
Settlement Panel went on to say that even if an environmental defense were available in
such cases, China did not meet the legal burden of proving such a defense in the raw
materials dispute (WTO 2011). To justify that those restrictions would contribute to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and human health, China needs to
demonstrate that it imposed these export restrictions in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption of the raw materials so as to conserve the raw
materials. Put simply, in claiming an environmental defense, China needs to demonstrate
while it has limited exports to foreigners, whether it has simultaneously taken steps to
limit domestic production or consumption, which is required under the GATT rule for
such an environmental defense. China’s Ministry of Commence states that China will
follow the WTO provisions, applying the same policy to domestic consumption of these
materials in China as that to foreign ones. This case does not touch on rare earths
specifically, but the facts and legal concepts are very similar between the raw materials
case and rare earths. However, no formal case has yet been brought concerning rare
earths because the affected countries are closely watching the final resolution of the raw
materials case. China has appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. Its final ruling will be a
decisive factor for the U.S., the European Union and Japan to determine whether to file a
separate WTO complaint on China’s rare earths policy.

3

This requirement means that wind power projects must have over 70% of their turbine
components locally made, and that the wind turbine generator must be assembled in
China. See Zhang (2010c and 2011c) for further discussion.
4
Until Western governments, business groups and media began pointing out the issues of
WTO consistency, Chinese officials had repeatedly stated that the policies were intended
to encourage companies to move production to China. They switched to emphasizing
environmental protection as the trade issues became salient (Bradsher 2011).
9
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BOX 1 CHINA’S DISPUTE ON AUTOMOBILE PART TARIFFS UNDER WTO
China lost its first-ever dispute with World Trade Organization on 18 July 2008, when a
panel on the WTO compliance of its auto part tariffs found in favor of the complainants –
Canada, the EU and the U.S. China imposed in April 2005 a 25% tariff on imported auto
parts, if the parts made up 60% or more of the value of a whole vehicle (Shen et al. 2008;
WTO 2009). This tariff rate equals the duty that China applies on imported automobiles
but exceeds its 10% tariff ceiling on imported auto parts. China had contended that the
higher tariff was necessary to prevent tax evasion by companies that import whole cars as
spare parts and then assemble them together inside China to avoid the higher tariffs
applicable to entire automobiles. However, the three complainants in the case maintained
that these higher charges unfairly discriminate against the use of foreign auto parts and
effectively subsidize domestic production. The complainants argued that the tariff not
only discouraged auto manufactures in China from using the imported parts, but also that
the higher tariff put pressure on foreign producers of auto parts to relocate manufacturing
facilities to China. On 15 September 2008, China notified its decision to appeal to the
Appellate Body. On 15 December 2008, the Appellate Body reports were circulated to
Members, upholding the Dispute Settlement Panel’s findings (WTO 2009). As a response
to the WTO decision, China decided since 1 September 2009 to give up this practice that
had been implemented for the past four years and to impose a uniform 10% tariff on all
imported auto parts (NDRC et al. 2009). Given the fact that Chinese auto manufactures
tend to produce cars with engines smaller than 2.5 liters and an amazing coincidence of
timing (the decision to make a large, upward adjustment in consumption tax for gasguzzler cars since 1 September 2008 (see Table 1) was less than a month after China lost
its WTO dispute), this move may be seen as a way for China to cut car imports without
offending the WTO.
Fundamentally speaking, no one/country forces China to produce a
disproportionate amount of goods for exports. On the contrary, the U.S. and other
countries, as well as economists such as Paul Krugman (2009), have accused China for
creating an imbalance of world trade by the artificial depression of its exchange rate to
promote its exports, although they may exaggerate the extent of China’s influence
(UNCTAD 2011) 5 and it is still questionable whether China’s practice can be adjudicated
to be “manipulation” under international law (Staiger and Sykes 2010). If one follows
China’s argument that these are European and American emissions, then it can be equally

5

UNCTAD (2011) in its policy brief recommends the use of the real effective exchange
rate as a practical and effective indicator to differentiate between sustainable and
unsustainable trade imbalances. It argues that a real effective exchange rate based on unit
labor costs is better suited to grasp changes in competitiveness than one based on
consumer price inflation. The latter misses out important elements of the catching-up
process of developing countries and may result in significant misinterpretation for some
important emerging economies like China.
10
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argued that these must have been European and American jobs.6 That puts globalization,
jobs and climate change into the same dispute, and here you have the makings of a nasty
trade flight (The Economist 2008). Given that job outsourcing in the current economic
crisis is extremely sensitive in the U.S. and EU, this does not do any good for China. In
particular, the U.S. has already had huge trade deficit with China, and has concerned
about further deterioration of its trade balance sheet with China. Pushing the
responsibility of the consumers in importing countries is definitely a tough sell to the
U.S. It may well be taken out of the context and be used to tackle China for other real
matters.7 Thus, China needs to treat, with caution, any issue that may potentially worsen
or relate to the trade deficit that it has with the U.S. Given that most carbon-intensive
industries in the U.S. run a substantial trade deficit (Houser et al. 2008), the U.S. may
well argue that imposing carbon tariffs and/or pushing for China to take on carbon
emissions caps as early as 2020 aims to reduce CO2 emissions embedded in goods
imported from China by levelling the carbon playing field for domestic producers and
importers.

Table 1 Consumption tax rates for cars in China
Engine (liters)
1.0 or less
1.0 < engine ≤ 1.5
1.5 < engine ≤ 2.0
2.0 < engine ≤ 2.5
2.5 < engine ≤ 3.0
3.0 < engine ≤ 4.0
Greater than 4

Excise tax since 1
January 1994 (%)
3
5
5
5
5
5
8

Excise tax since 1
April 2006 (%)
3
3
5
9
12
15
20

Excise tax since 1
September 2008 (%)
1
3
5
9
12
25
40

Source: Zhang (2010c).

6

This is not just about China versus industrialized countries. There is a bearing on
developing countries as well. It could bring China in conflict with other developing
countries. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) calculate the extent to which Chinese
companies are outcompeting their Latin American counterparts. They show that Latin
America is under a trade threat from China as well. Their analysis finds that 92% of Latin
America’s manufacturing exports were under threat from China by 2009, representing
39% of Latin America’s total exports.
7
When an issue in question has heavy dose of politics, no matter how small the impact
the issue itself has, it can be amplified and taken out of context making it potential
implications non-trivial. The Chinese food safety issue in the U.S. is an example. No one
would deny that China needs to take food safety concern seriously for the sake of both its
own citizens and consumers elsewhere. However, the issue has enlarged beyond that by
the politicians and the media due to the trade imbalance between the two countries.
11
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Moreover, China can be partly, if not equally, charged as guilty as the others.
While China never admits any wrongdoing and states that it will join international efforts
to tackle illegal logging and timber trade, Greenpeace (2006) and Environmental
Investigation Agency (2005) have criticized China for the responsibility of illegal logging
and deforestation in the Paradise Forests of Asia Pacific, which stretch from Southeast
Asia across the islands of Indonesia and on towards Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands in the Pacific. Their investigations reveal that such an illegal logging and
deforestation is driven by China’s imports of a huge amount of timber for making timber
products for its own use and exports to satisfy the rising, global demand for inexpensive
wood products (Reuters 2007). Existing studies on CO2 emissions embodied in trade only
consider energy-related CO2 emissions, and do not factor in the contributions of land use
change and forests to CO2 emissions. If the later factors are brought into equation, then
China’s act arguably reduces these countries’ capacity to use forests as a sink to absorb
global carbon and increases the CO2 emissions embodied in its imports.
Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions further complicates current
debate on the legitimacy of carbon tariffs. The U.S. legislators proposed to use border
adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the
U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime to level the carbon playing field. In the U.S. House
of Representatives, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2998)
(U.S. House of Representatives 2009), sponsored by Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and
Edward Markey (D-MA), was narrowly passed on 26 June 2009. The so-called Waxman–
Markey bill requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions allowances
corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries that have
not taken climate actions comparable to that of the importing country. This carbon tariff
proposal has drawn fierce criticism from China and India. Without specific reference to
the U.S. or the Waxman–Markey bill, China’s Ministry of Commerce said in a statement
posted on its website that proposals to impose carbon tariffs on imported products will
violate the rules of the WTO. That would enable developed countries to “resort to trade in
the name of protecting the environment”. The carbon tariff proposal runs against the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol.
This will neither help strengthen confidence that the international community can
cooperate to handle the (economic) crisis, nor help any country’s endeavors during the
climate change negotiations. Thus, China is strongly opposed to it (MOC of China 2009).
A World Bank study by Mattoo et al. (2009) shows that such a carbon tariff would cut
China’s manufacturing exports by 21% and India’s by 16%. No wonder that China and
India warned angrily of trade wars if such border adjustment taxes were imposed (The
Economist 2009a). However, if the consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions,
either implicitly or explicitly, is to indicate that the responsibility for the CO2 emissions
from the production of traded goods and services lies with the consumers in importing
countries, it can then be argued that the final responsibility for regulating those CO2
emissions lies with the governments of importing countries.8 Given that most carbon8

This is just one of the arguments for carbon tariffs. There are many factors that need to
be considered in order to ensure that trade measures would withstand a challenge by
trading partners before the WTO. See Zhang (2009, 2010b and 2011c) for detailed
discussion on the WTO scrutiny of emissions allowance requirements under a cap-and12
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intensive industries in the U.S. run a substantial trade deficit, this proposed EAR clearly
aims to level the carbon playing field for domestic producers and importers.
Furthermore, this type of thinking ignores the dynamics of China’s future
development. For decades, China’s blistering growth has depended on exports and
investment. The Chinese leaders have recognized that this capital-intensive, exportoriented growth model is no longer sustainable. Accordingly, China’s current 12th fiveyear economic plan (2011-2015) focuses on rebalancing an export-driven economy. As a
result, the Chinese economy is becoming more oriented towards the domestic market and
China is moving to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly and more broadly
against the currencies of all its trading partners. China has also adopted the concept of
inclusive growth to seek to ensure equal access to opportunities and balance economic
and social development with environmental costs. In the domestic context, inclusive
growth means that China’s economic and social development should guarantee a higher
standards of living for its people, which requires changing its current low wage or
practice to keep the costs of labor low in order to boost its exports. With all these changes
gradually taking place, China will rely less on trade to drive its economic growth. As
would be expected, the share of China’s carbon emissions embedded in exports is
expected to fall over time.
Finally, attributing emissions to consumers advocates the idea on who consumes
is responsible for pollution from consumed goods. If one accepts this consumers pay
principle and takes it into broad context, arguably it is rich people who are high emitters
and therefore are responsible for emissions in their countries. Following this logic, each
country would then have the task of reducing its national consumption according to its
number of high emitters - people with an extravagant output of carbon (The Economist
2009b). If the goal were to cap CO2 emissions at 30 billion tons in 2030 and the personal
emissions target would be set at around 10.8 tons of CO2 emissions per year, that would
mean squeezing the behavior of some 1.1 billion high emitters worldwide. China would
have 300 millions of people over this level by 2030, meaning that the country’s carbon
emissions should rise to no more than 8.5 billion tons in 2030, in comparison with the
11.4 billion tons projected under the business as usual scenario (Chakravarty et al. 2009).
Currently, this is just a fresh thinking, and has not been considered the main stream
thinking of allocating national emissions targets. However, if a consumption basis is
pushed too far, then the idea of basing the number of high emitters to determine allowed
national emissions levels may gain its relevance. If this is the case, then the increasing
number of high-living, carbon-guzzling rich Chinese people would not be able to hide
behind their poor and carbon-thrifty compatriots anymore and, as the aforementioned
results suggest, China would be asked to take on emissions caps even earlier and more
stringent than China would wish.

trade regime proposed in the Lieberman–Warner bill in the U.S. Senate and in the
Waxman–Markey bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, whether an EAR threat
would be effective as an inducement for major emerging economies to take climate
actions that they would otherwise not, and methodological challenges in implementing
EAR.
13
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4. Implications of China’s CO2 emissions embodied in trade
China has put a variety of national policies to boost industry and trade. These policies
should be responsible for the resulting CO2 emissions. In comparison with other countries
at its income level, China has an unusually large share of energy-intensive industrial
production and an unusually small share of the less energy-intensive service sector. For
example, 49% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 originated from the
industry sector and 40% from the service sector, while the corresponding figures for India
were 29% and 54%, respectively. Moreover, the differing composition of industry affects
the levels of energy intensity. China has a larger share of energy-intensive manufacturing
in industry than that in India, with manufacturing contributing to 34% of China’s GDP in
2008 relative to the corresponding 16% for India (World Bank 2010).9 In recognition of
the negative implications of its industry-oriented economy structure, China sets the target
to reduce the share of industry and increase the share of services in its GDP in the 11th
five-year economic plan period running from 2006 to 2010. Accordingly, the Chinese
government has taken great efforts towards changing the current energy-inefficient and
environmentally-unfriendly pattern of industrial growth. With a surge in energy use in
heavy industry, the Ministry of Finance of China and the State Administration of
Taxation started levying export taxes from November 2006 on a variety of energy- and
resource-intensive products to discourage exports of those products that rely heavily on
energy and resources, to help save scarce energy and resources. This included a 5%
export tax on oil, coal and coke; a 10% tax on non-ferrous metals, some minerals and 27
other iron and steel products; and a 15% tax charged on copper, nickel, aluminum and
other metallurgical products. Simultaneously, import tariffs on a range of items, including
26 energy and resource products such as oil, coal and aluminum, were cut from their
existing levels of 3–6% to 0–3%. From 1 July 2007, the Ministry of Finance of China and
the State Administration of Taxation (2007) eliminated or cut export tax rebates for 2831
exported items. This was considered as the boldest move to rein in exports since China
joined the WTO in December 2001. Among the affected items, which account for 37% of
all traded products, were 553 ‘highly energy-consuming, highly-polluting and resourceintensive products’, such as cement, fertilizer and non-ferrous metals, whose export tax
rebates were completely eliminated. This policy helps to enhance energy efficiency and
rationalize energy- and resource-intensive sectors as well as controlling soaring exports
and deflating the ballooning trade surplus. It will also help to control China’s CO2
emissions in exports.
From the point of view of leveling the carbon cost playing field, such export taxes
increase the price at which energy-intensive products made in China, such as steel and
aluminum, are traded in world markets. For the EU and U.S. producers, such export taxes
imposed by their major trading partner on these products take out at least part, if not all,
of the competitive pressure that is at the heart of the carbon leakage debates. Being
converted into the implicit carbon costs, the estimated levels of CO2 price embedded in
the Chinese export taxes on steel and aluminium are very much in the same range as the
9

Given that China’s GDP was 3.5–4.0 times that of India in 2008 (World Bank 2010),
this suggests that, in volume terms, energy-intensive manufacturing in China values 7–8
times that of India. Clearly, carbon tariffs have a greater impact on China than on India
(Zhang 2010b).
14
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average price of the EU allowances over the same period. Zhang (2009, 2010b and
2011c) have argued that there is a clear need within a climate regime to define
comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of
unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified by export tariffs that
China applied voluntarily during 2006–2008, defining the comparability of climate
efforts can be to China’s advantage (Zhang 2010b).
These policies brought positive outcomes, but are not enough. In the end, China
failed to reach its own set goals of economic restructuring in 2010. To control the growth
of its increasing demand for energy and oil imports as well as China’s CO2 emissions in
exports, China needs to strengthen its efforts to keep the expansion of inefficient and
highly polluting industries under control and to implement its own set industrial
restructuring and sustainable development policies.
China also needs to adjust its current trade structure. Processing trade involves
importing goods and re-exporting the imported goods after being processed. Since the
processing trade policy was implemented in late 1970s, the processing trade in China has
been developing in a sustained and rapid manner; the total volume of exports and imports
in the form of processing trade increased from US$ 2.5 billion in 1981 to US$ 831.9
billion in 2006, up by nearly 333 times. Its proportion in total foreign trade increased
from 5.7% to 48.6% during this period. While its share has dropped in recent years,
processing trade has still accounted for more than 41% of China’s total trade. Based on
panel data covering China’s 51 trading partners from 1993–2008, Xin (2011) shows that
processing trade accounts for 100% of China’s overall trade surplus and can explain most
of its bilateral trade balances. However, no matter how useful it is in promoting the
development and job creation, China needs to upgrade the processing trade. This is
considered essential not only to deepening China’s opening-up and maintaining its
international competitive edge, but also to improving the environment and limiting CO2
emissions.
The Chinese government clearly recognizes the importance. In addition to
supportive economic policies and market-based environmental instruments, governments
are exploring industrial policies to promote industrial upgrading and energy conservation.
Ministry of Commerce of China and the State Environmental Protection Agency (2007)
in October 2007 were in an unusual collaboration to jointly issue the antipollution
circular. Targeted at the booming export industry, this new regulation would suspend the
rights of those enterprises that do not meet their environmental obligations to engage
foreign trade in the period of more than one year and less than three years. A significant
portion of China’s air pollution can be traced directly to the production of goods that are
exported. In the Pearl River Delta, a major manufacturing region in Southern China, as
indicated in Figure 4, Streets et al. (2006) found that 37% of the total SO2 emissions in
the region, 28% of NOx, 24% of particulate matter (PM), and 8% of volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) are caused by export-related activities. In the city of Shenzhen alone,
the regional leader in industrial development and trade, 75% of VOCs, 71% of PM, 91%
of NOx, and 89% of SO2 emissions from the industrial sector were released in the
manufacturing of exported goods. Effectively implemented, this policy should help
polluting enterprises that export their products to pay attention to the environmental
effects of their products and produce more environmentally friendly products.
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Figure 4 Percentage of air pollutants tied to export manufacturing in the Pearl
River Delta and Shenzhen, China
Source: Streets et al. (2006).
Cutting China’s CO2 emissions in exports creates a new impetus for upgrading its
energy mix. China has relied on coal for about 70% of its total energy consumption over
the past decades to fuel its rapidly growing economy. Therefore, the amount of CO2
emissions in China and from the production of Chinese exports is attributed to this coaldominated energy mix in China. If the country could significantly cut the share of coal in
its energy mix, then the amount of CO2 emissions in China and from the production of
Chinese exports would be reduced dramatically, even if it would remain the largest
carbon emitter in the world. A country’s choice of fuels and technologies depends to a
large extent on its resource endowments and their relative prices. The fact that countries
like China and India use more coal is not because they prefer it, but because of their
abundant supplies of coal and its relatively lower price compared with its more
environmentally friendly substitutes. The trade-related emissions issue has created a new
impetus for encouraging the use of renewables and improving energy efficiency.
Increasing this share not only enhances energy security, but also is environmentally
friendly and conducive to good health. China had made great efforts in this area and has
already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the use of clean
energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, making further credible quantified
domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period and beyond.
Taking many factors into consideration, Zhang (2010c, 2011b,c) argue that China needs
to take on absolute emissions caps around 2030. However, it is hard to imagine how
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China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to
immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. To that
end, Zhang (2010c, 2011b,c) envision that China needs the following three transitional
periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps that
will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050: first, further credible
energy conservation commitments starting in 2013 and aimed at cutting China’s carbon
intensity by 46-50% by 2020 (Zhang 2011a); second, voluntary “no lose” emission
targets starting in 2018; and third, binding carbon intensity targets as its international
commitment starting in 2023. Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting
China’s rights to grow and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing
greenhouse gas emissions as China is approaching to be the world’s largest economy.
Cutting China’s CO2 emissions in production of goods for domestic consumption
and exports also requires increasing corporate social responsibility. While governments
determine the rules under which businesses act, set environmental goals and commit to
international environmental agreements, they count on enterprises’ full cooperation. After
all, the enterprises themselves are entities that make investment, use natural resources,
produce products and emit pollution. Foreign-invested enterprises have played a vital role
in boosting China’s trade. They have produced more than half of its exports, and have
dominated in its exports of electronics and information and communication technology,
accounting for more than 80% of China’s exports of these goods (Xin 2011). They
accordingly contribute to an increase in CO2 emissions produced in production of their
products for exports. Given that foreign-invested enterprises, in particular multilateral
corporations have financial resources and advanced technologies and management, they
are well positioned to set good examples for local Chinese enterprises, including the
compliance with environmental regulations standards. Their policies and strategies have
huge implications for others, in particular their suppliers. For example, until 2008 WalMart had adopted the “always low prices” as its slogan. While it benefits consumers by
keeping prices low, this practice comes at the cost of the environment. Keeping prices
low will put pressure on its suppliers, in particular those small suppliers, and squeeze
their profit margins. While multilateral corporations state that they are committed to the
high standards of social responsibility, keeping artificially low prices throughout their
supply base leaves their suppliers little or no room to internalize their externality costs.
Some have even no choice but to disregard the environment to win orders from
multilateral corporations. Recently, Chinese environmental groups have accused Apple
suppliers for pollution in China (Hook and Hille 2011). This is partly attributed to Apple
low purchasing price in its supply chain. Moreover, some transnational corporations
operate with double environmental standards, adopting low standards in their subsidiaries
in developing countries where there is the absence or lack of industry-specific national
standards or the implementation of these standards are weak, although they are capable of
improving the environmental performance of their subsidiaries. It has been widely
reported that over one hundred of multilateral corporations in China were blacklisted for
being noncompliance with China’s environmental regulations (Sina Net 2008). This is not
in China alone. It is also in other developing countries, including those more advanced
developing countries. Focusing on the rapidly developing electronics assembly industry
in the three border cities, Juárez, Mexicali and Tijuana in North Mexico, Schatan and
Castilleja (2007) found that 89% of the plants surveyed are foreign owned and many of
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their parent companies had introduced significant environmental measures in their
countries of origin. However, only slightly over half of the plants analyzed had
implemented an active environmental policy in Mexico.

5. Conclusions
China’s capital-intensive, export-oriented, spectacular economic growth since launching
its open-door policy and economic reforms in late 1978 not only has created jobs and has
lifted hundreds of millions of the Chinese people out of poverty, but also has given rise to
unprecedented environmental pollution and CO2 emissions. Estimates of the embedded
CO2 emissions in China’s trade differ, depending on the boundary assumed in the
calculation of embedded CO2 emissions, the choice of methodology and the treatment of
technology and emission intensity data across trading partners. Measured as a percentage
of total CO2 emissions produced in China, global studies based on more accurate country
trade flow and technology details tend to give a lower estimate of the embedded CO2
emissions than those single country study for China, which may fail to capture potentially
large national differences in technology levels between China and its trading partners.
However, both types of studies show that a hefty chunk of China’s CO2 emissions are
embedded in trade. This portion of CO2 emissions had helped to turn China into the
world’s largest CO2 emitter, and is further widening its gap with the second largest
emitter.
Who should be responsible for this portion of emissions and bearing the carbon
cost of exports is a very sensitive and complex issue. China certainly wants importers to
cover some, if not all, of the costs of that. China’s stance is understandable. Pointing this
out at least helps to have a better understanding of China’s emissions and their
contributions and bridge the gap between the concerns of China and developed countries.
However, if this is pushed too far, this paper has argued from a broad and balanced
perspective that on the contrary it can be to China’s disadvantage for several reasons.
First, China as the workshop of the world is largely the result of a comparative
advantage in the division of trade. Using less energy-efficient technologies to produce
goods for domestic use and exports is also largely dictated by its current stage of
development. It is fair to say that rapidly rising carbon emissions and emissions
embedded in exports are also the results of China’s deliberate, pro-trade policies. China
has not only adopted the common pro-trade policies, such as the depressed exchange rate
and export tax rebates, but has long used access to its unique giant customer base and
accesses to its certain raw materials and rare earth elements as leverage to induce foreign
companies to open factories in China or relocate their production to China. China not
only has been criticized for keeping its currency artificially low, but also has confronted
with many disputes with its trading partners, including the auto part tariffs, the local
content requirement for wind power projects, the export quotas on nine metal ores and
other raw materials, and the export quotas on rare earths. If one follows China’s argument
that these are European and American emissions from China’s own deliberate pro-trade
policies, then it can be equally argued that these must have been European and American
jobs. Given that job outsourcing in the current economic crisis is extremely sensitive in
the U.S. and EU, this does not do any good for China. Combined with the U.S. concerns
about existing huge trade deficit and further deterioration of its trade balance sheet with
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China, pushing the responsibility of the consumers in importing countries is definitely a
tough sell to the U.S. Moreover, this is not just about China versus industrialized
countries. It has a bearing on developing countries as well.
Second, China can be partly, if not equally, charged as guilty as the others. While
China never admits any wrongdoing and states that it will join international efforts to
tackle illegal logging and timber trade, China has long been criticized for the
responsibility of illegal logging and deforestation in Southeast Asia, in particular
Myanmar and Indonesia. Existing studies on CO2 emissions embodied in trade only
consider energy-related CO2 emissions, and do not factor in the contributions of land use
change and forests to CO2 emissions. If the later factors are brought into equation, then
China’s act arguably reduces these countries’ capacity to use forests as a sink to absorb
global carbon and increases the CO2 emissions embodied in its imports.
Third, consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions further complicates
current debate on the legitimacy of carbon tariffs. The U.S. proposed carbon tariffs have
drawn fierce criticism from China and India. However, if the consumption-based
accounting of CO2 emissions, either implicitly or explicitly, is to indicate that the
responsibility for the CO2 emissions from the production of traded goods and services
lies with the consumers in importing countries, it can then be argued that the final
responsibility for regulating those CO2 emissions lies with the governments of importing
countries.
Fourth, this type of thinking ignores the dynamics of China’s future development.
The savvy Chinese leaders have recognized that China’s capital-intensive, exportoriented growth model over the past decades is no longer sustainable. Accordingly,
China’s current 12th five-year economic plan focuses on rebalancing an export-driven
economy and inclusive growth, aiming for reliance less on trade and more on domestic
consumption to drive its economic growth. As would be expected, the share of China’s
carbon emissions embedded in exports is expected to fall over time.
Fifth, attributing emissions to consumers advocates the idea on who consumes is
responsible for pollution from consumed goods. If one takes this consumers pay principle
into broad context, arguably it is rich people who are high emitters and therefore are
responsible for emissions in their countries. Provided that the idea of basing the number
of high emitters to determine allowed national emissions levels would gain its relevance,
then the increasing number of high-living, carbon-guzzling rich Chinese people would
not be able to hide behind their poor and carbon-thrifty compatriots anymore and China
would accordingly be asked to take on emissions caps even earlier and more stringent
than China would wish.
While the aforementioned reasons argue that China is responsible for its carbon
emissions embodied in exports, it does not necessarily suggest the sole reliance on
domestic actions, no actions at the international level. In fact, to effectively control the
embedded CO2 emissions in China’s trade, actions need to be taken internationally as
well as domestically. At the national level, China needs to focus on rebalancing its
investment-driven, export-oriented economy, boosting the service sector and domestic
consumption and allowing its currency to appreciate more rapidly and more broadly to
reflect its real value. In this regard, it is crucial for China to take significant efforts to
keep the expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries under control and to
implement its own set industrial restructuring and sustainable development policies.
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China also needs to adjust its current trade structure. Processing trade has played a
significant role in promoting development and job creation in China. However, no matter
how useful it is, China needs to upgrade the processing trade. This is considered essential
not only to deepening China’s opening-up and maintaining its international competitive
edge, but also to improving the environment and limiting CO2 emissions in production of
goods for exports as well as for domestic consumption.
Cutting China’s CO2 emissions in exports creates a new impetus for upgrading its
energy mix and improving energy efficiency. China had made great efforts in this area
and has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation, the use of
clean energy and carbon intensity. It needs to extend its level of ambition, aiming for a
46–50% cut in its carbon intensity by 2020 and taking on absolute emissions caps around
2030 that will lead to the global convergence of per capita CO2 emissions by 2050. With
rising domestic energy demand and increasing difficulty further cutting energy and
carbon intensities, putting a price on carbon is considered a crucial step for China’s
endeavor of harnessing the market force to reduce its energy consumption and carbon
emissions and genuinely transiting into a low-carbon economy. It will make consumers,
be in China or abroad, to bear the carbon costs. China is experimenting low-carbon
provinces and low-carbon cities in five provinces and eight cities. Aligned with such
experiment, a carbon tax or a domestic carbon trading scheme, if established, will serve
as a cost-effective supplement to costly administrative means on which China has mainly
relied to meet its energy-saving goal in 2010. However, in terms of timing, given that
China has not levied environmental taxes yet, it is better to introduce environmental taxes
first, followed by carbon taxes, not least because such a distinction will enable to
disentangle China’s additional efforts towards carbon abatement from those broad
energy-saving and pollution-cutting ones. In case of a domestic carbon trading scheme,
the key issue is its scope and coverage. Given the fact that the costs of abating carbon
emissions differ significantly among emissions sources across provinces and sectors,
having broad coverage of emissions sources from all industries nationwide creates a
means of obtaining low-cost abatement options, thus minimizing the total cost of
complying with the national energy-saving and emissions goals. This is an ideal option.
In practice, however, carbon trading in China would have to start from selected sectors or
regions, although the limited scope and coverage will reduce its cost-effectiveness,
because China needs a reasonable length of time to develop and operate a national carbon
market. Moreover, to facilitate future integration of these fragmented sectoral or regional
schemes into a national emissions trading scheme, the central government should
establish from the outset the common standards for any sectoral or regional schemes to be
established and implement them strictly.
As experienced in China and elsewhere, even if multilateral corporations, which
have financial resources and advanced technologies and management and thus are well
positioned to set good examples for local enterprises, operate with double environmental
standards, adopting low standards in their subsidiaries in developing countries. Quite a
few even do not comply with China’s environmental regulations. Clearly, cutting China’s
CO2 emissions in production of goods for exports as well as for domestic consumption
requires strengthening the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations
and standards. This will prod companies to take increasing corporate social responsibility.
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Just like any country that will concern about the potential competitiveness loss of
unilateral imposition of carbon prices, China is no exception. At the international level,
cutting China’s CO2 emissions in exports therefore creates a new impetus for
strengthening international coordination on climate change and establishing a global
carbon price framework. It is the absence of a global carbon price that has failed to
internalize the carbon costs. Given that the internalization of carbon costs will send a
clear signal to both producers and consumers, therefore China and the international
community need to strengthen coordination in the internalization of the carbon costs,
ensuring that the costs of carbon emissions embodied in traded goods be reflected in the
price to the consuming countries as well as those goods for domestic use. This is a
feasible means of passing through a carbon cost to consumers without consumptionbased accounting of CO2 emissions, which is more data-intensive and complex than
production-based accounting of CO2 emissions. In this course, China needs to increase its
domestic carbon prices and support more stringent global greenhouse gas emissions
reductions to bring about higher, more consistent carbon prices internationally. Moreover,
China is still a developing country, no matter how rapidly it is growing. Industrialized
countries should significantly scale up their technology transfer and deployment,
financing and capacity building to encourage and enable China to undertake more
nationally appropriate mitigation actions than would otherwise have been the case.
Industrialized countries have promised new and additional climate finance at the
Copenhagen climate change conference. While their climate finance pledges are well
below expectations and demands from developing countries, industrialized countries have
to date failed to keep their climate finance pledges (Ballesteros et al. 2011). Given that
developing countries have explicitly linked progress in climate finance commitments
from industrialized countries with many other issues in international climate change
negotiations, the failure to deliver their pledges will not help build trust with their
developing country counterparts and break current impasses in international climate
change negotiations. While China has determined to deal with its own unprecedented
environmental pollution and rising greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels
and energy security as a result of steeply rising oil imports, international support is still
crucial to enabling China to accelerate its future development along a more sustainable
path. Given the coal-dominated energy mix in China, this also means that larger amounts
of greenhouse gas emissions in production of goods both for domestic consumption and
exports will be avoided than would otherwise have been the case. This helps to mitigate
global climate change. Clearly, this is the win-win outcome both for China and global
climate change.
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